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AN Act of the Legislature of Utah, approved March 10, 1892,
provided that "In all civil cases a verdict may be rendered on
the concurrence therein of nine or more members of the jury,"
and although sustained by the trial and Supreme courts of the
Territory, the opinion of the United States Supreme Court, ren-
dered recently by Mr. Justice Brewer in the case of The Ameri-
can Publishing Company v. A. Fisher and Aaron Keyser, has
held the Act to be unconstitutional. The principle which arose
in that case was the important but well established one as to the
extension of the United States laws over the Territories of the
United States and the consequent right to trial by jury as that
right existed at common law. The power of a State as distin-
guished from a Territory to abridge or amend the right to jury
trial had been decided before and was not touched upon in the
opinion.
This decision renews interest in the discussion of the better
adaptation of the jury system to the present conditions and re-
quirements of our society and emphasizes the need of a sug-
gested change which has recently been much debated. The
origin and growth of the jury is perhaps better suited for an
academic than a practical discussion and yet to many the pres-
ent rule of unanimity in civil cases seems so at variance with
our other institutions and customs that they are driven to the
supposition that it grew up and developed under conditions and
circumstances other than our own. The duty of the juror, it is
said, has changed from the giving to the weighing of evidence
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and yet this rule has been preserved in spite of the change. A
majority controls in other cases, the most important affairs of
nations are determined by majority votes and it is asked why a
different rule should be applied to civilians in their relations with
one another. Indeed, the question does not seem an idle one
when it is remembered that unanimity is not required to deter-
mine law although the correctness of law is perhaps even more
important than the correct finding of facts, for to the law other
facts are applied. Under our present system, moreover, five
Justices of the Tinited States Supreme Court may overrule four
of their associates who agree with three additional judges in the
court below and yet the law, thus decided by a minority of five to
seven of those who passed upon it, is considered sufficiently cer-
tain and settled. Indeed, if unanimity were to be required on
the bench the future determination of law would be most
dubious.
This wide and frequent disagreement in our courts is sometimes
sought to be explained by the previous training of our judges in
different States where differing principles prevail, but if this be
true it seems then reasonable that the same result should be ex-
pected in the case of our jurymen. It is not to be presumed
that a body of men taken from various employments and sta-
tions in life should unanimously agree upon any point as to
which there might be any opportunity for a difference of opinion,
and the consequence of the rule of unanimity is either to often
leave the issue undecided or to force its decision by means of
perjured ballots. The gravity of both of these alternatives is
apparent.
It is said by some that the moral effect of a verdict will be
weakened by a dissenting vote and that a loss of unanimity will
mean a loss of discussion. It might be suggested, however, in
reply that the defeated litigant will never be satisfied and that the
loss of moral force in the verdict, if the means by which unani-
mous verdicts are obtained are rightly understood, will hardly be
appreciable, should any in fact ensue. But in order to insure
discussion a certain time might be prescribed before which
nothing but a unanimous verdict would be received and after
which a majority of four or six would prevail. Indeed, if the
opinions of the jurors should be formed only upon that evidence
which has been produced in court it might be asked with appa-
rent reason whether those opinions should not also in the main
be formed before leaving the'jury box, uninfluenced by the per-
suasiveness or eloquence of a fellow juror. The value of jury
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
trial seems to be enhanced by the safety in numbers but the
safety in numbers is dependent upon preserving the individuality
of the jurymen.
In criminal cases, on the other hand, especially those involv-
ing capital punishment, the circumstances are open to a differ-
ent construction and it seems to be generally agreed that the
apparent popular aversion to the taking of life requires, at least
for the present, a unanimous verdict. This, however, would
only be recognizing the rule of evidence which in criminal cases
requires the proof of guilt to be beyond a reasonable doubt, but
in civil suits allows the verdict to follow the preponderance of
evidence. The Act of the Legislature of Utah, although held to
be unconstitutional, is interesting as evidence of the tendency
and desire to break away from the old common law rule of
unanimity and to make an adaptation to present needs and con-
ditions which in the eyes of some seems most necessary if the
jury system is to be maintained.
THE recommendation of a new course in a law school already
abundantly supplied is not to be made in a thoughtless moment
and yet the ease with which much good might be accomplished
persuades us to offer a suggestion as to a possible addition to the
curriculum of this as well as other law schools where such a
course as we have in mind has not been instituted. The average
apprentice in the study of the law is as ignorant of the tools with
which he is to work as is the beginner in other arts, and yet a
practical acquaintance with the tools of his profession is almost
as important, although not so difficult to obtain, as the theories
which should control their use. Next to a knowledge of the
law, therefore, we would place a knowledge of the means by
which to discover what the law may be, and to obtain that a few
hints as to the best use of law libraries and law books would
be of the greatest value. The use of the various digests
and encyclopedias, the method of tracing a case from its
inception to its final determination, and the best manner of col-
lating and verifying authorities is surely of sufficient importance
and interest to warrant some practical suggestions early in a
course of law instruction. A few lectures on Library Procedure
might with advantage be added to the curriculum of a law
school.
WITH this number the YALE LAW JOURNAL completes its
sixth volume and passes into the care of other editors. The past
EDITORIALS
year has seen a slight enlargement in the size of the magazine
and a slight increase in the number of contributions: the future
should see a still stronger growth and development. The three
years' course in the School will offer opportunity for a much-
needed connecting link between succe.eding editorial boards and
give the benefit of some experience to those who will assume
control. The thanks of the Board are due to Prof. E. G. Buck-
land and Dr. W. Frederic Foster for so kindly serving upon the
committee to judge the competitive essays submitted by the
Junior candidates for editorial positions on the JOURNAL. For
the kindness of those who have contributed to the JOURNAL or
otherwise aided in making this volume possible the present
editors express their sincere appreciation; for those who are to
succeed us we wish an experience as pleasant as ours has been
and the success which should result from their efforts.
THE editorial board of the YALE LAW JOURNAL fO7. the ensuing
year will be composed as follows: Charles Frederic Clemons,
Chairman; Edward William Beattie, Jr., Secretary and Treasurer;
William Ansel Arnold, William Bradford Boardman, Frederick
Stephen Jackson, Addison Strong Pratt, Ernest Clyde Simpson
and Harrison Graw Wagner.
In the competition for the JOURNAL Essay the successful essay
was written by Charles Frederic Clemons.
